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I.  Introduction 
Markets are commonplace in all types of societies, including the poorest, and they 
exist even in remarkably unfavorable conditions.  Herodotus, for example, describes 
Phoenician merchants who traded even with distant tribes with whom they shared no 
government or language.  A long-standing literature on “silent trade” among those who 
cannot communicate directly includes accounts of tribes that traded when at war (Grierson, 
1904).  Long experience with black markets in many countries confirms that markets persist 
even when they are prohibited.  Nevertheless, some markets that are essential for economic 
development are less common and more easily repressed.  These are markets in which 
economic actors make exchanges requiring significant and irreversible commitments in the 
present, whether in the form of goods manufactured and shipped or fixed investments made, 
in the expectation of payment or a stream of returns in the future.   
These markets are less likely to exist when institutions for the protection of property 
rights and contract enforcement are absent.  The importance of these institutions is now 
widely acknowledged, and emphasized in the work of North (1990), Rosenberg and Birdzell 
(1986) and others.  Recent studies of growth have employed subjective indicators of 
contract enforcement and the security of property rights (e.g. Knack and Keefer, 1995 and 
Borner, Brunetti and Weder, 1995) to provide significant empirical support for the 
proposition that the absence of these institutions is a severe impediment to growth.  This 
paper makes two contributions to the literature.  First, it introduces a new, easily accessed 
and objective measure of the enforceability of contracts and the security of property rights.  
Second, it uses this measure to provide additional and more direct evidence about the 
importance of secure property and contract rights for economic growth and investment.  In 
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the analysis below, we briefly review the arguments that link the quality of third-party 
contract enforcement to growth and investment.  We then show how the new measure, 
which we call “contract-intensive money” or CIM, relates to the subjective measures 
employed in the literature.  We test empirically the proposition that this variable, as a 
measure of the security of contract and property rights, is positively related to income, 
growth and investment.    
II.   Why does government enforcement of contracts matter?  
The markets that are most likely to persist even in unfriendly environments are those 
in which exchange is simultaneous and self-enforcing.  These markets are common, either 
because many exchanges simply meet the conditions for self-enforcement or because they 
are so lucrative that the absence of self-enforcement makes even risky exchanges 
worthwhile. However, many transactions require a different kind of market, one more likely 
to need third-party enforcement.  These are non-simultaneous transactions, in which the 
quid is needed at one time or place and the quo at another.  When there is lending and 
borrowing, capital is lent in expectation of a later return.  When a demander and a supplier 
are some distance apart, one must be at risk for the value of the goods in transit.  When 
there is insurance, some parties must make payments now in hope of indemnification if 
specified contingencies occur.  In all of these cases, the gains from trade cannot be realized 
unless the parties expect that the contracts they make will be carried out. 
For example, we do not often see sophisticated capital markets where there is no 
third-party enforcement of loan contracts or of rules protecting agreements between 
shareholders and management, or between minority and majority shareholders (see La Porta 
et al, 1996).  Firms in societies without third-party enforcement are usually restricted to 
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capital that can be obtained through saving or family connections.  Gains from either 
capital-intensive or large-scale production are accordingly lost in these societies. The 
absence of these exchanges hinders investment and growth.  Since investment is usually 
required for innovation and the purchase of new technologies as well as capital deepening, 
contract enforcement also affects the rate of growth.   
The contract-intensive money indicator of property rights enforcement that we 
introduce below indicates the countries and periods in which non-simultaneous transactions 
are more difficult to enforce.  Inadequacies in government-provided third-party enforcement 
are likely to be a principal reason for these difficulties.
1
  It is true, even in societies with the 
best legal systems, most disagreements are resolved without being taken to court 
(Williamson, 1983, 1985).  One reason, as David Hume (also Hayek, 1948, and many others 
since) noted long ago, is that a reputation for honoring commitments is valuable.  Other 
agreements are made self-enforcing by allowing valuables to be held hostage (as, most 
simply, in a pawn shop loan).  It is not even the case that third-party resolution of disputes is 
solely the province of government, since arbitration and dispute settlement services are also 
available in the private sector.  Moreover, countries are likely to vary in their capacity to 
support reputation and other self-enforcement mechanisms.
2
  
Nevertheless, the market has clear limits in enforcing contracts.  Reputation is of 
more limited utility for transactions in which the actors involved deal with each other 
                                                          
1
     The importance of third-party enforcement of contracts has long been recognized.  In 1651 Thomas 
Hobbes said that, in the absence of government, the party that “performs first has no assurance that the other 
will perform after, because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle men’s ambition, avarice, anger, and 
other passions without the fear of some coercive power” (1958, p 15).  The distinction between self-enforcing 
transactions and those that require third-party enforcement are key to the arguments in North (1990).  Olson 
(1992) analyzes the difficulties of the transition from communism in terms of this distinction. 
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infrequently.  Neither reputation nor socially-acceptable hostages are useful when 
transactions are exceptionally large or performance can only be verified over a long period 
of time.  Private institutions that disseminate information on contract violations are less 
useful when the reasons for breach of contract cannot be conveyed; when firms that receive 
the information fail to impose the appropriate punishment strategy; when firms that breach 
contracts are able to mask their identities; and when the contractual arrangements that 
undergird the existence of the organization that collects and disseminates information about 
breaches of contract are themselves unenforceable.   
Even after accounting for the effects of self-enforcement, then, the government still 
has four crucial roles to play in contract enforcement and the protection of property rights.  
First, it provides third-party enforcement when no self-enforcing mechanism exists.  
Second, it may itself constitute the entity that communicates breaches of contract.  Third, it 
may enforce the arrangements that private actors use to constitute themselves as a formal 
group (such as a trade association).  Fourth, and most elementally, the government ensures 
peace: if there is a Hobbesian anarchy, a reputation for effective violence is worth more 
than one for honoring commercial contracts.  But whatever authority has the power to 
maintain peace also has the power to enforce or to abrogate contracts.  It follows that even if 
private agents could, without recourse to governments or other third parties, engage in every 
profitable investment or exchange by relying on self-enforcement, they would still confront 
the possibility that the government could expropriate them.  Differences in the behavior of 
governments therefore make for cross-country differences in property rights, contract 
enforcement, and levels of productivity and growth.   
                                                                                                                                                                                 
2
     For example, Knack and Keefer (1997) find an association between the protection of property rights and 
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III. Testing the Theory: Contract-Intensive Money 
In testing our argument that secure property and contract rights are crucial for 
productivity and growth, we take advantage of a fortuitous circumstance, that enforcement 
problems underlying the use of different forms of money and credit mirror enforcement 
problems underlying trade in goods and services in much the way a negative resembles a 
print.  Though the gains from issuing money ensure that it is available everywhere, the types 
of money that are most widely used vary greatly from country to country.  In some 
countries, currency is the only money that is widely used.  In others, individuals and firms 
are more likely to use the types of money that are held in banks or invested in other 
financial institutions or instruments.  Characteristics of third-party contract enforcement in 
countries are likely to explain much of the difference in firm and individual preferences 
governing the choice of money to use.  This, and the fact that data on both types of money 
usage are regularly reported and widely available, make a monetary measure of the security 
of property and contract rights an attractive one to investigate.  
There are several reasons why the same governmental deficiencies that require self-
enforcement of transactions also lead economic actors to prefer currency.  If contracts are 
generally unreliable, there can be no assurance that the money lent to financial institutions is 
safe.  Moreover, when financial institutions cannot rely on third-party-enforcement of loan 
contracts -- and when property rights are not clear, so that lenders do not have secure rights 
to mortgaged assets in the event of borrowers' defaults -- then they cannot earn as much 
with the depositors' money.  This means in turn that there will be less financial 
intermediation and higher charges for banking services.  Finally, where governments choose 
to prohibit many transactions, creating black markets in which contracts are inherently 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
levels of interpersonal trust in countries. 
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insecure, the discretion afforded by currency is likely to make it a favored medium of 
exchange.   
In societies where contract and property rights are secure and well defined, on the 
other hand, even transactions that are heavily reliant on outside enforcement can be 
advantageous, and currency is normally used only for small transactions.  In such 
environments, it is also profitable to provide extensive banking and financial intermediation 
services.  Individuals and firms are increasingly able to invest their currency in bank 
deposits or financial instruments, and are likely to prefer these to currency for several 
reasons.  They are normally safer and more convenient than currency.  These instruments 
are also more lucrative, since interest is generally paid on such deposits, unlike currency 
holdings.  As is evident from the work of Townsend (1983), when more sophisticated forms 
of money and trade credit are available, individuals and firms not only can trade without a 
double coincidence of wants, but they are also spared much of the opportunity cost of 
significant intervals between the receipt and the spending of money.  A final advantage of 
using monies in financial institutions is that this provides records that enhance the legal 
rights of the parties and thereby reduce their risks. 
Thus the extent to which societies can capture not only the gains from self-enforcing 
transactions, but also those potential trades that are intensive in contract enforcement and 
property rights, can be approximated by the relative use of currency in comparison with 
"contract-intensive money."  We define contract-intensive money (CIM) as the ratio of non-
currency money to the total money supply, or (M2-C)/M2, where M2 is a broad definition of 
the money supply and C is currency held outside banks.  Fortunately, there are data on the 
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quantities of both currency and M2 for almost all countries.3  Each firm and individual can 
decide, after taking account of the type of governance in that society, in what form it wants 
to holds its assets.  Where citizens believe that there is sufficient third-party enforcement, 
they are more likely to allow other parties to hold their money in exchange for some 
compensation, and CIM is correspondingly higher.   
The discussion suggests the following set of hypotheses.   
First, if CIM is a good proxy for contractual enforcement more generally, then the higher a 
country's CIM ratio, the larger the share of GDP that should be generated by industries that 
are especially dependent on third-party enforcement, such as those involved with insurance 
and capital markets.   
Second, the higher CIM, the more gains from economies of scale and specialization a 
country should reap and thus the higher its capital stock, productivity, and per capita 
income.   
Third, the higher CIM, the greater the ability of firms to raise capital, the higher the rate of 
investment and (other things, like the opportunity for catch-up growth, equal) the faster the 
rate of economic growth.  However, secure individual rights to contract enforcement and to 
property will help most in obtaining those gains from trade and specialization that can be 
completed only over a long period of time, such as those involving long-term loans.  
                                                          
3  Currency comes from line 14a of International Financial Statistics, “currency outside deposit money banks.” 
It does not include foreign currency in circulation, since there are no reliable measures of this, although 
foreign currency deposits in financial institutions, which are easily measured, are included in M2.  M2 is 
defined by IFS as the sum of money and quasi-money, or the sum of lines 14a (currency outside banks), 24 
(demand deposits), 15 (time deposits), and 25 (time and savings deposits, including foreign currency deposits 
of resident sectors other than central government).  We cannot control for variations in the mix of different 
types of money in M2.  For example, we would expect that where the incentives to hold currency increase, so 
also do incentives to substitute out of time deposits and into demand deposits.  However, all components of 
M2, including time and demand deposits, share the critical feature that they rely on economic actors to 
surrender control over their money to third parties for some period of time.  
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Therefore, CIM should be more closely associated with the gains from trade in the capital 
market than with the gains from trade in the economy as a whole, and thus better correlated 
with investment than with growth. 
Note that we are not suggesting that the greater use of more sophisticated, non-
currency monies causes better economic performance; we are hypothesizing instead that 
better institutions, especially with respect to contract enforcement, enable a society to obtain 
a wider array of (real) gains from trade, and, at the same time, facilitate the use of more 
sophisticated forms of money.  Thus CIM is a reflection or measure of the type of 
governance that improves economic performance rather than a cause of that performance. 
Before we turn to the statistical tests of our hypotheses, we examine, in Section IV, 
some especially instructive country cases.  Since the CIM ratio not only offers a precise test 
of our theory, but also a new measure of the quality of governance and institutions, we 
relate it, in Section V, to other measures of quality of governance.  We then present in 
Sections VI-VIII a variety of evidence that stronger economic performance is associated 
with higher values of CIM. Sections IX and X respond to possible objections to our tests.  
Section XI concludes. 
IV. CIM Case Studies 
If CIM is a good measure of the security of contract and property rights, dramatic 
political events or changes of regime affecting these rights should change the CIM ratio.  
They do, and in directions that are consistent with our argument.  We looked for countries 
that experienced sharp and sudden political changes and present CIM time series graphs, 
along with a brief summary of political events for each of these countries, below.  Where 
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data are available from IFS Yearbooks, we trace CIM from 1960 forward; for other 
countries, the beginning date is 1969. 
1. Iran 
The Shah ruled Iran from the 1950s until he was overthrown by a revolution led by 
Khomeini in 1978. The new regime had no respect for the rights of those who had been 
allied with the old regime or who did not fully support the new regime and follow its 
religious doctrine.  There was a period of revolutionary turmoil and a dramatic change in 
the social order.  Iraq launched a war against Iran in September 1980 that lasted until 1988.  
CIM was at relatively high and stable levels under the Shah, then dropped sharply with 
Khomeini's takeover, the revolutionary turmoil, and the attack by Iraq.  As the new regime 
established a relatively stable order and as the war with Iraq came to an end, the CIM ratio 
increased and approached its former level. 
2. The Gambia 
Sir Dawda Jawara led Gambia from 1962 through 1992, winning re-election in 
several meaningful elections.  In October of 1980, however, the Gambian government had, 
out of fear of a coup by its own military, requested that Senegal station troops in the 
Gambia. In 1981, while Sir Dawda was out of the country, left-wing rebels staged a coup 
that was suppressed only with the help of Senegalese troops.  The data indicate a substantial 
upward trend in the contract-intensive money ratio from 1969 to 1990 (consistent with the 
general stability of the regime) that is interrupted in the 1978-82 period. 
3. Chile 
Following a period of unsustainable expansionary policies, accelerating inflation, 
and some moves by the Allende government away from a market economy based on private 
 10 
property, a military government took over in 1973.  Within a few years the new government  
dramatically changed economic management in the direction of economic orthodoxy in 
microeconomic, monetary, and fiscal policies.  The late 1970s and early 1980s witnessed a 
degree of unorthodoxy in the use of exchange-rate policy to combat inflation, and these 
policies, perhaps combined with the explosion of the Mexican debt crisis in 1982, produced 
a banking crisis in 1982, followed by a severe recession.  By 1985 the severe recession was 
over, macroeconomic policy seemed to be back on track, and the regime continued to 
pursue its economically orthodox policies including deregulation and privatization of the 
economy.  The data show a marked decline in CIM in the early 1970s, followed by a 
dramatic rise in the ratio in the late 1970s, remaining at a very high level since the 
mid-1980s. The ratio exhibited only a moderate negative reaction to the macroeconomic 
and financial crisis of the early 1980s, suggesting that CIM was not very sensitive to the 
problems of the financial sector and that its increase in the late 1970s and its steadiness at a 
high level in the 1980s was mainly a consequence of the security of contract enforcement 
and property rights. 
4. Brazil 
There was a similar dramatic change in economic policy in Brazil after the military 
coup in 1964.  Recession occurred in 1965 and 1966, as the new regime brought inflation 
down from the high level in the last years under Goulart.  From 1967 to 1974 there was 
what has been described as "the economic miracle," and growth remained high during the 
1970s, although it was based on excessive foreign borrowing and was ultimately 
unsustainable. 
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The data for Brazil from the IFS yearbooks do not correspond to the data on the IFS 
tapes for the years 1969-70.  Thus there is a break in the series.  The data in the earlier 
series show a fairly constant level of CIM during 1960-64, followed by a jump in 1965 and 
a gradual rise in the late 1960s.  The later series shows a further rise during the 1970s and 
1980s.  The data for Brazil stop in 1985. 
5. Grenada 
According to the Europa Yearbook, Grenada functioned as a democracy during its 
pre-independence years in the 1960s and up through independence in 1974.  But Grenada 
was not a placid democracy like its neighbor, Barbados.  In the late 1970s the opposition 
accused Prime Minister Gairy of being autocratic and corrupt, and in 1979, Maurice Bishop, 
the leader of the left-wing PRG (People's Revolutionary Government), led a bloodless coup.  
The constitution was suspended.  During 1980 and 1981 there was an increase in repression 
and mounting fears by the PRG of an invasion by the U.S.  During 1982 Grenada was 
aligning itself with Cuba and the USSR.  In 1983 the armed forces were put on alert out of 
fear of a US invasion.  Bishop tried to conciliate the U.S., but was assassinated in a coup by 
more radical forces.  The U.S. invasion occurred in October 1983.  By December, most 
American troops had pulled out.  There were preparations during 1984 for elections, which 
were held in December.  Though there was tension over the trial of the coup leaders and 
restrictions on some left-wing politicians in 1988 and 1989, there was a return to democracy 
and relative stability. 
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Though there is a break in the data series for Grenada in 1983,
4
 the year of the 
second coup and the U.S. intervention, the data are nonetheless instructive.  From the 
mid-1970s to 1983, when political developments must have made contract and property 
rights less secure, there was a large decline in CIM.  The new data series starting in 1984 
shows an increase in CIM along with the installation and gradual consolidation of a new 
democratic regime. 
6. Turkey 
The following summary paraphrases Haggard and Kaufman (1992, p. 289).  The 
democratic government began losing control over the economy in the late 1970s.  There was 
political fragmentation under proportional representation: government coalitions proved 
difficult to form, were hostage to the demands of small anti-system parties, and were pulled 
toward policy positions more radical than those of most of the electorate.  In these 
circumstances it was difficult to cut government expenditure or adjust to the withdrawal of 
foreign lending.  A stabilization program was announced in January 1980, but the 
government was quickly deadlocked over political issues and was ousted by the military in 
September.  An economist, Ozal, became the leading economic policy maker under the 
military, and he won the (less-than-free) election held in 1983.  In 1988, after democracy 
had been restored, he was re-elected. 
                                                          
4
     The Eastern Caribbean Central Bank was established in that year, and the currency figures become more 
precise starting in 1984.  Prior to that year, the numbers of Eastern Caribbean Dollars circulating in Grenada 
were based on estimates, while after that year, the ECCB placed a letter "G" on the EC Dollars issued there 
and was therefore able to track the currency circulation precisely. This information was kindly supplied by Mr. 
Kawar of the IMF. 
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The data show a flat level of the CIM ratio from 1972 to 1975, followed by a decline 
to 1978.  There was a slight recovery in 1979 and 1980, a jump in 1981, followed by a 
gradual rise to 1986, and then another mild decline in the late 1980s. 
7. Indonesia 
In the 1960s the country suffered serious macroeconomic and political instability.  In 
1965 an attempted communist takeover failed and was followed by a civil war in which 
millions were killed and the Communists suppressed.  In 1966 Western-trained economists 
gained Suharto's ear and a stabilization program was carried out in the late 1960s.  After  
1970 Indonesia was ruled by a stable single-party government with an economic 
bureaucracy that was, because of the low level of independent interest-group mobilization 
and the absence of electoral pressures, relatively insulated and able to continue orthodox 
economic policies.  (See also Haggard and Kaufman, 1992, p. 289). 
The data show a fairly flat level of CIM in the early 1960s; there are no data for 
1963 and 1964.  There is some rise from 1965 to 1968, consistent with the end of the civil 
war, followed by a dramatic and sustained rise from 1970 onward as the new regime 
showed evidence of considerable staying power, predictable enforcement of contract and 
property rights, and prudence in the management of economic policy. 
Most of the foregoing countries fall into two main groups.  In one group of countries 
-- Chile, Brazil, and Indonesia -- weak governments with ill-chosen interventionist 
economic policies were replaced by strong military dictatorships in which economic 
technocrats had considerable influence.  In all three cases, the CIM ratio rose dramatically 
after the change in government and economic policies.  In the second group of countries -- 
The Gambia, Grenada, and Turkey -- a democratic regime suffered a period of political 
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uncertainty with an actual or threatened military coup, and then after a time democratic 
stability was restored.  During the period of turmoil there was a decline in the CIM ratio but 
this ratio rose again after the restoration of democracy.  These patterns are consistent with 
related work the authors have done (see Clague, Keefer, Knack and Olson, 1996) suggesting 
that the security of contract and property rights is greater under strong and secure autocrats 
than under those of short tenure or in transient democracies and reaches the highest levels in 
lasting democracies. 
V. CIM and Complementary Measures of the Quality of Governance 
The specific country examples offer reassurance that contract-intensive money 
mirrors real changes in politics, institutions, and economic policies.  In this section we 
provide evidence that it is also positively correlated with independent measures of quality of 
governance and institutions used in prior studies.  These independent measures are 
systematic subjective ratings generated by scholars, such as Gastil's indexes of political 
freedoms and civil liberties (used, for example, in Scully 1988) or produced by private firms 
that meet the market test by selling their measures of political and institutional risk to 
investors, such as the ICRG, BERI and BI ratings (introduced by Knack and Keefer, 1995, 
Mauro, 1995, and used by many others).   
There is a danger that these subjective measures may be influenced by outcomes -- 
when economic performance is good, the evaluators may be subtly induced to report that 
governance is also good.  The CIM ratio may also have some limitations; a study of the 
period averages for individual countries in Appendix C suggests that some of the cross-
country variation in CIM may be idiosyncratic and have little to do with differences in 
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contract enforcement and security of property.
5
  Fortunately, because the subjective 
measures and CIM --which is an objective outcome of portfolio decisions by individuals 
and firms in the countries at issue -- are generated by different and independent processes, 
they almost certainly have no idiosyncracies or biases in common.  Thus it is a good sign 
for CIM, and for the subjective measures, that CIM’s correlations with these 
complementary measures of institutional quality are fairly high and remarkably consistent 
(at .62 or .63).  Each type of measure adds credibility to the other. 
Beyond its objectivity and precision as an indicator of property rights security, CIM 
also has the virtue of being readily available on a timely basis for a large number of 
countries (and for many of them the data go back quite a number of years).  Since CIM 
appears to be both a credible and a useful new measure of the quality of a country’s 
institutions and economic policies, we proceed to test its relationship to economic 
outcomes. 
VI. Governance and the Size of Finance and other Contract-dependent Sectors 
The first hypothesis suggested by the foregoing discussion is that those sectors of the 
economy that are especially dependent on contract enforcement should be relatively larger 
in those countries with better contract enforcement and property rights.  Levine (1998) 
provides evidence that subjective indicators of property rights are an important determinant 
of the extent of financial intermediation in a country and concludes that “countries that 
effectively enforce compliance with laws [governing the legal rights of creditors, among 
other things] tend to have better-developed banks than countries where enforcement is lax 
(p. 598).”  In this section, we expand on this theme by showing that CIM as well as the 
                                                          
5
     For example, South Africa has the 3rd-highest value, while Malawi ranks above Belgium. 
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subjective measures are positively associated with the development of a wide range of 
contract-intensive activities. 
The insurance industry, for example, is exceptionally dependent on contract 
enforcement, since those who pay premia receive nothing on the spot and can benefit from 
insurance only if the policy contract is honored when there is a valid claim, often long after 
the contract has been signed.  Accordingly, we obtained data on insurance premia as a 
percent of Gross National Product up to 1994 from the International Insurance Council and 
tested whether CIM and other measures of institutional quality predicted average insurance 
premia (from the five years 1990 through 1994) over GDP for the period.  Since the demand 
for insurance may be related to income and wealth, we controlled for per capita GDP 
(1990).  As Table 1 shows, there is a statistically significant positive association between 
CIM (and ICRG and BERI) and the relative size of the insurance industry.  Each 10-
percentage point rise in CIM is associated with a rise in the insurance share of GDP of 
about 1.2 percentage points -- a sizable amount, since on average the insurance sector 
comprises four percent of GDP.   
To obtain the broadest reasonable measure of the industries that are especially 
dependent on contract enforcement, we took the aggregate of the finance, insurance, real 
estate, and business services sectors as a percentage of GDP from the UN National 
Accounts data.  This measure was available for more countries and years than was the 
insurance data, so we use the average of this variable over the 1980-90 decade as the 
dependent variable in equation of Table 1.  Again, all three of the measures of institutional 
quality are positively related to the size of the financial sector, holding per capita income 
(1980) constant, and all but one of the relationships is statistically significant. 
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VII.  CIM and the Level  of Income and Wealth 
The second hypothesis generated by our argument is that the better are institutions as 
measured by CIM, the greater the degree of specialization and the gains from trade and the 
higher the level of capital accumulation, productivity, and per capita income.  We test this 
hypothesis using the specifications introduced by Hall and Jones (1996) in their study of the 
determinants of income per worker in 1988.  Hall and Jones include the ICRG index of 
property rights along with several other independent variables listed in the note to our Table 
2.  We replicate their regressions for the countries in their sample for which CIM data are 
available, except that we replace ICRG with CIM in one case, and add CIM in another 
(leaving ICRG as one of the Hall and Jones base regressors).  Coefficients and standard 
errors for CIM and ICRG (but not for the other Hall-Jones regressors) are shown in Table 2.  
Adjusted R-squares in the first two rows of the top panel of Table 2 show that CIM's 
explanatory power slightly exceeds that of ICRG and that CIM is a significant determinant 
of income per worker even in the presence of ICRG.  
Hall and Jones also estimate determinants of factor accumulation, first physical 
capital and, second, human capital.  The second panel replicates their regressions of capital 
stock per worker, as estimated by them, on the same independent variables, with results 
broadly similar to those in the first panel.  The third panel replicates the Hall-Jones human 
capital equation, in which they use the Barro-Lee (1993) educational attainment measure for 
1985 as the dependent variable.  Again, CIM (with or without ICRG in the model) is 
significantly related to factor accumulation.  Finally, Hall and Jones estimated total factor 
productivity as a residual, regressing these estimates on the same set of independent 
variables.  The bottom panel of Table 2 shows that total factor productivity is significantly 
related to CIM.  The correlation between CIM and the level of economic development does 
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not depend on the Hall-Jones specification; we obtained similar results with other 
specifications.   
VIII.  CIM, Investment, and Growth 
In this section, we enter contract-intensive money into widely-used cross-country 
investment and growth regressions.  Variable definitions, data sources and descriptive 
statistics used in these regressions are provided in the Appendix.  The independent variables 
we employ in addition to CIM are conventional in this literature (see Barro, 1991, and 
Levine and Renelt, 1992).  Higher initial GDP per capita  should be associated with lower 
productivity of additional investment and lower subsequent growth.  The relative price of 
investment goods as a percentage of the U.S. level, should be negatively associated with 
investment.  Schooling attainment, measured as the mean years of completed education for 
the population aged 25 and over is a proxy for human capital.6  Bruno and Easterly (1998) 
and others have found that inflation can have a negative effect on investment and growth.  
To ensure that inflation's effects on currency demand do not influence our results, we 
therefore add a measure of inflation to each regression.  This is the depreciation in the real 
value of money introduced by Cukierman and Webb (1995), i.e., DEP = INF/(100+INF), 
where INF is the rate of inflation in percent.  (We consider inflation in more detail in 
Section X).  
The regression results on the determination of the ratio of investment/GDP, 
averaged over the 1969-90 period for which CIM data are consistently available for a large 
sample, are shown in Table 3.  Equation 1 shows a strong, positive, and highly significant 
                                                          
6 Pritchett (1996) finds that school enrollment is not a good proxy for the stock of educational capital and that 
increases in the stock of educational capital do not predict increases in output.  The conventional specification 
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relationship between CIM and investment.  Results for CIM are very similar for a 
subsample of developing (non-OECD) nations in equation 2, indicating that CIM is not 
merely capturing broad differences between the groups of developed and developing 
nations.   
Standardized estimates of CIM’s association with investment are large relative to 
those of other independent variables.  A one-standard-deviation increase in CIM (i.e. an 
increase of .14) in equation 1 is associated with an increase in investment as a proportion of 
GDP of one-third of a standard deviation, or about three percentage points.  This effect 
exceeds the impact of a one standard deviation increase of any one of the other four 
independent variables.  
Since CIM and economic performance are measured contemporaneously in our 
analysis, our correlations conceivably capture effects of the latter on the former.  
Accordingly, in equations 3 and 4 respectively, we substitute the initial-year (1969) and 
end-year (1990) values of CIM for its 1969-90 average.  The coefficient for initial CIM 
exceeds that for the end-of-period (1990) CIM value.  When both are entered together in a 
regression (not shown), the coefficient for initial CIM is more than double that of the final 
CIM, and only initial CIM is statistically significant.  Both results are contrary to what we 
would expect if our estimates using the 1969-90 average were biased upward by reverse 
causality.   
To ensure that the association between CIM and investment in equation 1 is not 
sensitive to outliers, we report results of robust and median regressions in equations 5 and 
6.  The CIM coefficient is changed very little. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
may nonetheless be justified since school enrollment may be a proxy measure of the desire and capability of a 
country’s government to provide public goods that the market would otherwise underprovide. 
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Adding other regressors such as the real interest rate, population growth, indicators 
of trade openness, and government size similarly leaves the CIM coefficient substantially 
unchanged.
7
  Finally, we obtain similar results for CIM when the average of private 
investment/GDP for 1970-85 as constructed by Barro (1991), and the average of equipment 
investment/GDP for 1975-85 as estimated by DeLong and Summers (1991), are substituted 
for total investment.
8
 
Growth equations are reported in Table 4.  The growth regressors are the same as 
those used for investment, expect that the price of investment goods is omitted.  In equation 
1, CIM is positively and significantly related to growth.  Each standard deviation increase in 
CIM is associated with an increase in annual per capita growth of nearly one-half of a 
standard deviation, or nearly one percentage point.  The association between CIM and 
growth is slightly weaker when developed nations are excluded, in equation 2.  The growth 
regressors are the same as those used for investment except that the price of investment 
goods is omitted. 
Equation 3 omits the school enrollment variables, which is arguably endogenous to 
CIM.  Where contract and property rights are enforced, the returns to specialized education 
may rise, and will also aid in the development of credit markets, which may make education 
beyond the primary level feasible for the poor (Galor and Zeira, 1993).  As expected, the 
CIM coefficient increases somewhat when schooling is omitted in equation 3.    
                                                          
7
     A "monetarist" interpretation of CIM also suggests that real interest rates should be controlled for.  Doing 
so only trivially affects the CIM coefficient and at a substantial cost in sample size due to gaps in the interest 
rate data.  We therefore do not include the real interest rate in all regressions. 
8
     Results described in this paragraph are available on request.  We use total investment from Summers and 
Heston (1991) as our primary investment variable because it is likely measured more accurately than are 
estimates of private or equipment investment. 
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The addition of investment/GDP as a regressor in equation 4 indicates that much of 
the impact of the contract enforcement and governance as measured by CIM is through 
investment effects rather than through efficiency effects.  The CIM coefficient in equation 4 
is less than one-half its value in equations 1 through 3.  This result is consistent with the 
conceptual framework outlined in section II.   
Results from robust and median regressions reported in equations 5 and 6 indicated 
that the association between CIM and growth is not sensitive to a few significant 
observations.  The CIM coefficients in these tests are slightly larger than in equation 1.  As 
in the case of investment, results also are little affected by adding other commonly-used 
regressors such as population growth, trade intensity, and government size.   
Unlike the case with CIM and investment, there is some evidence that the CIM-
growth relationship may partially arise from reverse causality.  The coefficient for end-of-
period (1990) CIM exceeds that of initial (1969) CIM when these two variables are 
substituted for the period average of CIM (whether in separate regressions or together).  
Accordingly, we attempt in equation 6 to test the growth impact of the exogenous 
component of CIM using two stage least squares.   
The instruments for CIM include the other right hand side variables (currency 
depreciation, initial income, and schooling), the percentage of a country’s population 
belonging to the largest ethnic group, and a set of colonial heritage dummies, indicating 
whether a nation was colonized by the British, the French, the Spanish, the Portuguese, or 
by others (e.g., the Dutch, Belgians, Italians or Japanese), or was never colonized.  The test 
of overidentifying restrictions fails to reject the null hypothesis that the instruments do not 
belong in the growth equation.  Results in equation 7 indicate that the exogenous 
component of CIM is significantly correlated with growth.   
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The tests reported in tables 3 and 4 are all cross-sectional tests on country averages 
over the 1969-90 period.  Our focus here is not as much on short-term policy changes as on 
continuing institutions for contract enforcement and property rights that, in stable 
environments, should not change much from year to year.  We have not, in general, run tests 
treating each country-year in our sample as a separate observation.  Nonetheless, we briefly 
summarize here severe tests of CIM’s relationship to economic performance, focusing only 
on the idiosyncratic variations over time in CIM, investment, and income in each country.  
We do this using two-way fixed effects models, with country and year fixed effects, both 
with the annual data and with decade averages.  These tests should capture most 
connections CIM has with short- and medium-term changes in policy and with the less 
stable countries where there are major institutional changes in a given year or decade.  We 
find that variations over time within countries in CIM are significantly correlated with 
changes in investment, but not with changes in growth. 
IX.  Is CIM a measure of the contracting environment or financial sector 
development?   
Significant research has identified a strong and causal relationship between financial 
development and growth (King and Levine 1993a, Levine 1998), leading lead one to 
reasonably ask whether contract-intensive money is simply an alternative measure of 
financial sector development.  This is a difficult question since, as Levine (1998) has 
shown, financial sector development is itself very sensitive to subjective measures of the 
security of property and contract rights in a country.  We offer several arguments in favor of 
the conclusion that CIM is properly regarded as a broad measure of the general security of 
contracts and property rights in all sectors of a country and not primarily those in the 
financial sector.  
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Measures of financial development reflect basic contractual features of a country, 
but they also track specific characteristics of the financial sector, such as the extent to which 
the sector facilitates diversification and the monitoring of managers (see Levine, 1997).  
Conversely, measures of the security of property rights, including CIM, while indirectly 
related to the capacity of the financial sector to diversify risk, should more directly and 
strongly capture the overall security of transactions in a country, including not only 
financial sector transactions, but all contracts that put substantial resources at risk of 
contractual non-compliance (such as contracts between independent power producers and 
utilities).  They should also capture not only the risk of government expropriation of 
financial assets (for example, through bank nationalization), but the expropriation through 
arbitrary regulation or outright confiscation of any type of fixed asset.   
One piece of evidence that CIM is more appropriately categorized as a general 
indicator of contractual and property rights rather than as an indicator of financial 
development is its significant correlation with subjective measures of institutional quality, 
discussed earlier.  A more rigorous test of the proposition is to conduct a factor analysis of 
many different measures of "quality of governance and institutions," on the one hand, and 
"financial development" on the other, using the four indicators of financial depth in King 
and Levine (1993a), CIM, and six different measures of institutions in the factor analysis.  
We allow the analysis to identify two factors.  As Table 5 shows, the institutional variables, 
including CIM, load most heavily on Factor 1.  The absolute value of the Factor 1 loading 
of CIM is twice that of its Factor 2 loading.  The four indicators of financial development, 
PRIVY, M2/GDP, PRIVATE and BANK (described in the data appendix), all load more 
heavily onto the second factor.  These are the results one would expect if CIM is 
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predominantly an indicator of the security of contracts and property rather than of financial 
development.   
A third piece of evidence that CIM is more of an institutional than a financial sector 
variable emerges from our country examples.  These show that CIM tracks dramatic 
political developments that have little to do directly with the financial sector, although they 
may, simultaneously, also influence the usual measures of financial development.  
Finally, CIM and indicators of financial development seem to capture different 
aspects of economic growth and investment.  If we return to the growth and investment 
equations of the previous section, adding King and Levine's primary measure of financial 
depth, M2/GDP, leaves the CIM coefficient essentially unchanged.  This is evident in 
equations 7 of Tables 3 and 4, where the CIM coefficient is only slightly less after the 
inclusion of the measure of financial depth than it is in the base sample.  Financial depth is 
also significant, further reinforcing the notion that the variables capture different aspects of 
the institutional and economic environment in countries.  CIM isolates the impact of 
improved contract enforcement and property rights security, which has a generalized effect 
that encompasses but is not exclusive to the financial sector.  M2/GDP captures the specific 
attributes of the financial sector that increase growth and investment, including the effect of 
the financial sector on the ability of economic agents to diversify risk and exert control over 
managers.   
On the basis of these tests, we argue that CIM, even though it is derived from data in 
the money markets, is nevertheless most appropriately regarded as a more general measure 
of the quality of governance and institutions.  There are policy implications of this 
conclusion.  Countries with low CIM (or low scores on other, more subjective measures of 
property rights and contract security) would be advised to examine closely government 
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policies related to enforcement of contracts between private economic actors and the due 
process guarantees that governments afford firms and individuals when they create and 
implement policies.  Countries that exhibit low indicators of financial development need to 
address both the general contractual environment that inhibits growth of the financial sector 
and also examine specific policy issues that affect the sector, including the presence of 
discriminatory taxation (King and Levine, 1993b), laws unfavorable to creditors, and poorly 
developed bankruptcy procedures.   
X. Alternative explanations for the CIM findings  
There are three possible problems that could arise in interpreting the foregoing 
results.  The first is that CIM might be an artifact of inflation, interest rates, or monetary 
policies.  CIM is related to inflation in two contrary ways.  On the one hand, inflation 
reduces the value of money and raises nominal interest rates, and therefore provides an 
incentive to shift money from currency and non-interest bearing accounts into interest-
paying time deposits or into foreign currency accounts.  This increases CIM.  If changes in 
CIM were driven by changes in inflation in this way, it would be less likely that we would 
find positive associations between CIM and growth, investment, or other, subjective 
indicators of the security of property and contract rights.   
On the other hand, with very high rates of inflation there is also greater uncertainty 
about the rate of inflation and even about the viability of the existing governmental and 
financial institutions.  This makes deposits in financial institutions, and especially deposits 
with limits or penalties on timing of withdrawals, riskier, and tends to reduce CIM.  If this 
effect dominates, higher CIM would be associated with lower inflation; since lower 
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inflation is likely to be associated with higher growth and investment, the possibility arises 
of a spurious positive relationship between CIM and these economic outcomes.   
We have two pieces of evidence that our CIM results are not simply an artifact of 
inflation-related phenomena.  First, all of our results are robust to the inclusion of inflation, 
as Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate.  Second, we find that only when the rate of inflation is very 
high – above about 60% per year – is it associated with lower CIM.  Below this level, 
however, higher rates of inflation are associated with higher CIM, creating a bias for most 
of our observations against finding a positive relationship between CIM and growth and 
investment. 
The second possible problem with interpretation arises if CIM is only a proxy for 
savings.
9 
 Countries with high savings rates (due, for example, to age profiles of their 
populations) might, because time deposits and other financial instruments are better 
vehicles for saving than currency, have high values of CIM.  Since national saving rates are 
highly correlated with national investment rates, the association of CIM with investment 
might be a product of these influences.  We examine this issue in two ways, and find no 
support for the conclusion that CIM is simply a proxy for savings rates.  First, in a fixed 
effects regression of the annual observations of CIM on income and saving, with time and 
country dummies, we find that the coefficient of saving is extremely small.  This result is 
robust to a variety of specifications.  Second, we find that CIM is also a strong predictor of 
components of total investment -- private investment and equipment investment -- that are 
                                                          
9
     We owe this suggestion to Brian Fikkert. 
 
 27 
not forced, through accounting identities, to be as strongly associated with savings rates as 
is total investment.  
XI.  Conclusions 
This paper contributes to a growing literature that emphasizes the institutional or 
governmental prerequisites of markets.  While it is true that the markets for many self-
enforcing transactions emerge spontaneously and bring some gains from trade everywhere, 
many of the markets that a society needs if it is to develop and achieve its economic 
potential are missing in most countries.  In this paper we the claim that only countries where 
governments give private parties the capacity to make credible commitments that they could 
not otherwise make, and thereby achieve gains from trade that they could not otherwise 
obtain, achieve their economic potential. 
This paper contributes to a growing literature that emphasizes the institutional or 
governmental foundations of well-functioning markets.  While it is true that the markets for 
many self-enforcing transactions emerge spontaneously and bring some gains from trade 
everywhere, many of the markets that a society needs if it is to develop and achieve its 
economic potential are missing in most countries.  In this paper we use our new measure of 
the security of contract enforcement and property rights, Contract-Intensive Money, to 
support the claim that only countries where governments give private parties the capacity to 
make credible commitments that they could not otherwise make, and thereby achieve gains 
from trade that they could not otherwise obtain, achieve their economic potential.   
We base the importance of CIM on the following three propositions:  (1) the 
contract-intensive money ratio is a measure of the proportion of transactions that rely on 
third-party enforcement; (2) this proportion is a good indicator of the reliability of contract 
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enforcement and the security of property rights in countries; and (3) contract enforcement 
reliability and property rights security are important for high levels of productivity and rapid 
economic growth.   
While it is difficult to test these propositions one at a time, we have marshalled a 
good deal of evidence that is consistent with all three.  In a series of case studies of dramatic 
change in politics and governance, CIM changed in ways consistent with these propositions.  
CIM is also correlated with other, subjective measures of the quality of governance and 
institutions that are now widely used in the literature. 
Consistent with the theory, countries with relatively high values of CIM -- and 
relatively high scores on other measures of quality of governance -- have relatively more 
insurance and financial development.  This is true even though we control for the level of 
per capita income.  Governments that give their citizens the capacity to obtain more gains 
from trade and specialization also improve economic performance in other ways.  The 
empirical evidence developed in the paper indicates that CIM is strongly associated with the 
size of the capital stock, the level of per capita income, and the total factor productivity of 
countries.  We also find that countries with a high level of CIM tend to grow faster and to 
exhibit higher rates of investment.   
The paper concludes by investigating three interpretations of these results that 
diverge from the one that we offer, that CIM is a measure of the security of property and 
contract rights, and that it is the insecurity of these rights that suppresses investment and 
growth.  We present evidence, however, that is inconsistent with these three interpretations:  
differences across countries in levels of CIM are not predominantly due to differences with 
respect to financial sector development, inflation, or savings.   
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In sum, this paper introduces a measure of the security of economic rights that is 
available for many countries and for long periods, constituting, therefore, a valuable new 
resource for empirical studies.  Because this measure is objective, and not based on 
subjective evaluations, we are also able in this paper to present the most persuasive 
evidence to date that economic growth and investment significantly accelerate when 
governments impartially protect and precisely define the rights of all participants in the 
economy.   
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 Table 1 
 Contract Intensive Money and the Financial Sector      
 
 
Equation 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 4 
 
 5 
 
 6 
 
Dependent variable: 
 
Insurance/GDP 1990-94 
 
Finance/GDP 1980-90 
 
Constant 
 
-17.060 
 (2.498) 
 
-4.471 
(4.453) 
 
-8.137 
(3.275) 
 
-12.516 
(2.515) 
 
-12.006 
(3.685) 
 
-11.969 
 (6.547) 
 
Initial (log) GDP per 
capita 
 
1.679 
(0.456) 
 
0.385 
(0.694) 
 
0.534 
(0.581) 
 
1.822 
(0.447) 
 
2.295 
(0.484) 
 
2.535 
 (1.031) 
 
Contract Intensive 
Money   
 
 7.682 
(2.765) 
 
 
 
 
 
11.007 
(2.686) 
 
 
 
  
  
 
ICRG 
 
 
 
0.153 
(0.048) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.186 
(0.062) 
 
 
 
BERI 
 
 
 
 
 
1.132 
(0.308) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.392 
(0.445) 
 
Adj. R
2
 
 
.47 
 
.41 
 
.55 
 
.41 
 
.34 
 
.26 
 
N 
 
57  
 
62 
 
44 
 
104 
 
78 
 
 45 
 
Mean, D.V. 
 
3.90 
 
4.07 
 
4.31 
 
10.7 
 
10.3 
 
12.1 
 
Standard errors (in parentheses) are computed using White's heteroskedastic-consistent variance/covariance matrix. Finance/GDP  is the percentage of 
GDP accounted for by finance, insurance, real estate and business services, from UN National Accounts  data.  
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 Table 2 
 CIM and Levels of Output, Factor Accumulation and TFP 
 Summaries of Regression Results 
 
 
 
 
 CIM 
 
 ICRG 
 
 R2 
 
Log output/ 
worker, 1988 
 
 
 
 
1.938 
(0.411) 
 
 .78 
 
 
 
1.852 
(0.384) 
 
 
 
.79 
 
 
 
1.393 
(0.422) 
 
1.274 
(0.428) 
 
.80 
 
Log capital/ 
worker, 1988 
 
 
 
3.446 
(0.685) 
 
.69 
 
 
 
 
4.143 
(0.569) 
 
 
 
.74 
 
 
 
3.504 
(0.656) 
 
1.772 
(0.735) 
 
.75 
 
Schooling/ 
worker, 1985 
 
 
 
8.356 
(1.245) 
 
.74 
 
 
 
 
5.736 
(1.204) 
 
 
 
.70 
 
 
 
3.290 
(1.203) 
 
 6.787 
(1.336) 
 
.76 
 
Log TFP, 1988 
 
 
 
0.488 
(0.299) 
 
.66 
 
 
 
0.816 
(0.312) 
 
 
 
.68 
 
 
 
0.773 
(0.339) 
 
0.120 
(0.319) 
 
.67 
   
 
Cells of table report coefficients for CIM and ICRG.  White-corrected standard errors are in parentheses.  Other 
independent variables in every equation are: latitude (distance from the equator), percent English-speaking, percent 
speaking another "international language," dummies for "capitalist-statist" and "capitalist" systems ("statist" is reference 
category), and fraction of years from 1950-94 with open economy (from Sachs and Warner, 1995).  Sample size is 110.   
 
 35 
Table 3 
 Contract Intensive Money and Investment/GDP, 1970-92     
 
 
Equation 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 4 
 
 5 
 
 6 
 
 7 
 
Variation 
 
Basic 
model 
 
Non-
OECD 
 
CIM 
1969 
 
 CIM 
1990 
 
 Robust 
 regression 
 
 Median 
 regression 
 
M2/GDP 
added 
 
Constant 
 
-16.064 
 (5.816) 
 
-9.882 
(6.210) 
 
-12.512 
 (5.848) 
 
 -12.698 
 (5.648) 
 
 -14.765 
 (7.203) 
 
 -11.852 
 (7.998) 
 
-10.061 
 (5.499) 
 
Log 1970 
GDP per capita 
 
2.359 
(0.810) 
 
1.658 
(0.899) 
 
2.638 
 (0.781) 
 
 2.595 
 (0.817) 
 
 2.267 
 (1.000) 
 
 2.059 
 (1.115) 
 
0.933 
(0.799) 
 
Mean years of 
schooling 1970 
 
0.552 
(0.350) 
 
0.955 
(0.536) 
 
 0.555 
 (0.363) 
 
 0.764 
 (0.342) 
 
 0.635 
 (0.356) 
 
 0.627 
 (0.388) 
 
0.520 
(0.293) 
 
Currency deprec. 
mean 1969-90 
 
-6.087 
(4.190) 
 
-6.618 
(5.571) 
 
-6.352 
(4.371) 
 
 -4.082 
 (4.275) 
 
 -4.738 
 (5.157) 
 
 -3.116 
 (5.661) 
 
18.672 
(4.990) 
 
Price level  
inv. goods, 1970 
 
-0.027 
(0.011) 
 
-0.025 
(0.010) 
 
-0.032 
(0.010) 
 
 -0.029 
 0.012) 
 
 -0.032 
 (0.010) 
 
 -0.039 
 (0.011) 
 
-0.022 
 (0.010) 
 
Contract-Intensive 
Money, 1969-90  
 
20.745 
(5.457) 
 
17.248 
(5.880) 
 
15.097 
(4.523) 
 
 12.559 
 (5.105) 
 
 19.664 
 (6.688) 
 
 18.186 
 (7.379) 
 
 18.065 
(4.882) 
 
M2/GDP, 1969-90 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 9.649 
(2.924) 
 
Adj. R
2
 
 
.61 
 
.47 
 
 .60 
 
 .59 
 
 -- 
 
 -- 
 
.68 
 
Sample size is 72 in equation 2, and 95 for all other equations.  Standard errors (in parentheses) are computed using  
White's heteroskedastic-consistent variance/covariance matrix, except in equations 5 and 6.  R
2
 does not have its usual  
interpretation in equations 5 and 6.  Mean of dependent variable is 16.9 for 95-country sample, and 14.2 for 72-country sample.  
 
 
 
 
 36 
Table 4 
 Contract Intensive Money and Growth, 1970-92     
 
 
Equation 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 4 
 
 5 
 
 6 
 
 7 
 
 8 
 
Variation 
 
Basic 
model 
 
Non-
OECD 
 
Schooling 
omitted 
 
 Inv/GDP
added 
 
 Robust 
regression 
 
 Median 
 regression 
 
 2SLS 
 
M2/GDP 
added 
 
Constant 
 
-0.162 
 (1.920) 
 
 0.906 
(2.078) 
 
-1.849 
 (1.153) 
 
 2.960 
 (1.917) 
 
 -0.710 
 (2.219) 
 
 -0.788 
 3.395) 
 
 -2.196 
 (2.745) 
 
1.638 
 (1.776) 
 
Log 1970 
GDP per capita 
 
-0.477 
(0.308) 
 
-0.496 
(0.331) 
 
-0.286 
 (0.276) 
 
 -0.789 
 (0.279) 
 
 -0.558 
 (0.317) 
 
 -0.602 
 (0.476) 
 
 -0.726 
 (0.378) 
 
-0.832 
(0.308) 
 
Mean years of 
schooling 1970 
 
0.116 
(0.099) 
 
0.342 
(0.133) 
 
  
 
 0.035 
 (0.090) 
 
 0.088 
 (0.114) 
 
 0.097 
 (0.176) 
 
 -0.009 
 (0.149) 
 
0.108 
(0.083) 
 
Currency deprec. 
mean 1969-90 
 
-4.028 
(1.085) 
 
-5.348 
(1.513) 
 
-4.100 
(1.059) 
 
 -3.009 
 (1.035) 
 
 -3.220 
 (1.641) 
 
 -2.332 
 (2.617) 
 
 -4.201 
 (1.735) 
 
-2.076 
(1.050) 
 
Contract-Intensive 
Money, 1969-90  
 
6.751 
(2.598) 
 
4.945 
(2.731) 
 
7.571 
(2.423) 
 
 2.860 
 (2.226) 
 
 8.168 
 (2.030) 
 
 8.383 
 (3.048) 
 
 12.425 
 (4.541) 
 
  5.936 
(2.342) 
 
Investment/GDP 
1969-90 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.147 
 (0.033) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M2/GDP, 1969-90 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3.093 
(0.901) 
 
Adj. R
2
 
 
.21 
 
.22 
 
 .60 
 
 .37 
 
 -- 
 
 -- 
 
 -- 
 
.29 
 
Sample size is 72 in equation 2, and 95 for all other equations.  Standard errors (in parentheses) are computed using White's  
heteroskedastic-consistent  variance/covariance matrix, except in equations 5-7.  Instruments in 2SLS include a set of colonial heritage  
dummies and Sullivan’s (1991) measure of ethnolinguistic homogeneity.  R2 does not have its usual interpetation in equations 5-7. Mean of  
dependent  variable is 1.30 for 95-country sample, and 1.03 for 72-country sample.  
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Table 5 
 Factor Analysis of Governance and Financial Development Indicators 
 
 Rotated Factor Pattern (Varimax Rotation) 
 
 
Variable 
 
 Factor 1 
Loadings 
 
 Factor 2 
Loadings 
 
Gastil index 
 
 .89 
 
 -.25 
 
Executive constraints 
 
 -.80 
 
 .25 
 
Wright property rights index 
 
 .75 
 
 -.25 
 
CIM  
 
 -.72 
 
 .36 
 
ICRG property rights index 
 
 -.72 
 
 .54 
 
Revolutions & coups frequency 
 
 .51 
 
 -.37 
 
Kobrin expropriation frequency 
 
 .45 
 
 -.44 
 
PRIVY 
 
 -.28 
 
 .85 
 
M2/GDP 
 
 -.18 
 
 .81 
 
PRIVATE 
 
 -.44 
 
 .70 
 
BANK 
 
 -.53 
 
 .66 
 
Variable definitions and sources are listed in the Appendix. 
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Appendix:  Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Variable definitions and sources  
 
Growth 1970-92 
 Average annual per capita GDP growth in percentage points, log method.  
Source: Summers and Heston (1991).    
 
Investment/GDP, 1970-92  
 Investment as a percentage of GDP.  
Source: Summers and Heston (1991).  
 
Log Initial GDP per capita, 1970  
 Source: Summers and Heston (1991). 
 
Schooling, 1970 
Average number of years of completed education, 25 and over population. Source: Barro 
and Lee (1993).  
 
Price level of investment goods, 1970 
 As a percentage of the U.S. level.  
Source: Summers and Heston (1991).  
 
Contract-Intensive Money (CIM), 1969-90 
 Ratio of noncurrency component of M2 to total M2 (see text, footnote 3)   
Source: International Financial Statistics (IFS). 
  
Currency depreciation, 1969-90   
Inflation rate/(100 + inflation rate).  
Source: IFS. 
 
BANK 
Ratio of deposit money bank domestic assets to deposit money bank domestic assets plus 
central bank domestic assets, average from 1960-89.  
Source: King and Levine (1993), as constructed from IFS.     
 
PRIVATE 
Ratio of claims on the nonfinancial private sector to total domestic credit (excluding 
credit to money banks), average from 1960-89.  
Source: King and Levine (1993), as constructed from IFS.  
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PRIVY 
Ratio of claims on the nonfinancial private sector to GDP, average from 1960-89.  
Source: King and Levine (1993), as constructed from IFS.  
 
M2/GDP, 1969-90  
 Source: IFS.   
 
Revolutions + Coups 
 Average number per year, 1960-88.  
Source: Arthur Banks, SUNY Binghamton.  
 
Gastil Index 
Sum of political freedoms and civil liberties indexes, each scaled 1-7, averaged from 
1973-86.  
Source: Scully (1992).  
 
ICRG Index 
Sum of 5 subjective variables each scaled 1-10: rule of law, quality of bureaucracy, 
corruption, risk of expropriation, and government repudiation of contracts.  
 Source: Knack and Keefer (1995), as constructed from International Country Risk Guide, 
1982-90.  
  
BERI Index 
Sum of 4 subjective variables each scaled 1-4: bureaucratic delays, contract 
enforceability, nationalization potential, and infrastructure quality.  
Source: Knack and Keefer (1995), as constructed from Business Environmental Risk 
Intelligence, 1972-90.  
 
BI Index 
Sum of 4 subjective variables each scaled 1-10: bureaucracy and red tape, quality of legal 
system and judiciary, risk of nationalization, and corruption.  
Source:  Constructed from selected Business International (1982-89) variables used in 
Mody and Wheeler (1992).  
 
Wright Property Rights Index  
Subjective 1-4 rating, with higher scores indicating worse protection of property rights. 
Source:  As reported in Scully (1992).    
 
Kobrin Expropriation 
1-4 ordinal scale defined by frequency of expropriations or nationalizations in 1960-79 
period, with higher values indicating greater frequency. 
Source:  As reported in Kobrin (1985).  
 
Executive Constraints 
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1-7 ordinal scale of constraints on power of the executive, with higher scores indicating 
more constraints.  
Source: Gurr (1990).  
 
 
Descriptive Statistics for  
95-country sample used in tables 3 and 4  
 
 Mean Std. dev.   
Growth, 1970-92  1.30   1.96 
Inv/GDP, 1970-92  16.9    8.4   
Log per capita GDP, 1970  7.75  0.95 
School attainment 1970  3.62  2.79 
Currency depreciation 1969-90  0.13  0.11 
Price of inv. goods, 1970  97.7   60.8 
CIM, 1969-90  0.78   0.13 
M2/GDP, 1969-90  0.43  0.25 
   
                        
 
